

AVOIDANCE

Avoidance:

The ability to remove a lien.

The Bankruptcy Code permits the debtor to avoid some kinds of liens that interfere with or impair the debtor's fresh start. For example, judgment liens attached to the debtor's home can be avoided if the value of the liens (mortgages, judgment liens and statutory liens) are greater than the value of the exemption claimed. The underlying purpose of the avoidance provisions is equality of distribution among similarly situated parties.

From the judgment in *Re Tousa* 10/13/09:

"In a preference claim under 11 U.S.C. Section 547, the debtor is presumed insolvent during the bankruptcy. There is no presumption of insolvency in a fraudulent transfer claim. Thus, the burden of proof is on the creditor. In a preference claim, the defendant must prove solvency; in a fraudulent transfer claim, the plaintiff must prove insolvency.

Section 548(a)(1)(B) permits the avoidance of any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation of the debtor, that was made or incurred within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation and

(A) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent within 90 days after the date of such transfer or obligation,

(B) was engaged in a business or transaction, or was about to engage in a business or transaction, and the capital remaining with the debtors was an unreasonably small capital; or

(c) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the ability of the debtor to pay as such debts matured

The "balance sheet" test of insolvency per Section 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I) requires proof that the sum of the debts of the debtor is greater than the fair value of that subsidiary's property

Fair valuation, in the context of a going concern, "contemplates and estimate of proceeds realizable within either collection or sale at regular market value." See *Pembroke Dev. Corp. vs. A.P.L. Windwo*, 122 B.R. 610 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) also *Lawson v. Ford Moto Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.)*, 78 F. 3d 30, 35 (2nd Cir. 1996)

"Fair valuation for our purposes here is indistinguishable from fair market value. It is the estimate of the assets within a reasonable time either through collection or sale at the regular market value, rather than the amount which could be obtained for the property in question within such period by a willing business man from an interested buyer who is willing to purchase under the ordinary selling conditions." See *Valencia (in re Duque Rodriguez)*, 75 B.R. 829, 831 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987)

Because "a fair valuation of assets contemplates a conversion of assets into cash during a reasonable period of time," the value of the assets "should be reduced by the value of the assets not readily susceptible to liquidation and the payment of delinquent debts."

Trans World Airlines, Inc. (In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.), 134 F. 3d 188, 194-195 (3d Cir. 1998).

The court may, in reaching conclusions on "fair valuation" adopt the asset values of one party or the other, valuation figure after weighing all of the evidence. See *In re Roblin Indus. Inc.*, 78 F. 3d at 35.

"To decide whether a firm is insolvent within the meaning of S. 548(a)(2)(B)(I), a court should ask: What would a reasonable liquidator receive for the debtor's *entire package* of assets and liabilities. If the price is positive, the firm is insolvent; if negative, it is not. See *Commercial Nat'l Bank of Peoria*, 960 F. 2d 657, 660 (7th Cir. 1992).

Example: "The price that a potential buyer of a homebuilding business would pay would reflect the price at which the buyer could ultimately sell its individual assets, but a discount to reflect the costs of sale and the present value of income that would be earned only in the future. See *Co., Inc.*, 905 F. 2d 166 (7th Cir. 1990) ("going concern" valuation of retailer should reduce retailer's mark-up, which covers retailer's cost of sales); *Syracuse Eng'g Co. v. Haight*, 110 F. 3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998) (court would necessarily consider future costs when calculating how much to pay for debtor's assets); *Inc. v. Hollywood, Inc. (In re Emerald Hills Country Club)*, 32 B.R. 408, 415 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (condominium/apartment units for fair valuation because the discounted price accounted for market value over a year period and the reality that the assets could not be sold immediately); cf. *Samson v. Alton & Ebbler Furniture & Appliances, Inc.*, 804 F. 2d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1986) (the wholesale cost of inventory is the standard as a rule because a buyer in the same business or industry as the debtor "would still be able to sell the goods, costs that would have to be subtracted from the retail price to determine the value of the assets").

The "fair valuation" standard does *not* "require the taking into account of the sum which could be realized of certain articles 'in the slow process of trade' or through collection from debtors without property 'by payment of the debt.'" 1 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL PARAGRAPH 101.32[4] (3D ED. 1997)

Two legal doctrines sometimes permit a court to treat otherwise distinct and independent entities as a single entity: the equitable doctrine of substantive consolidation and the "alter ego" doctrine (sometimes referred to as the "piercing the corporate veil" doctrine). Strict requirements limit the use of these doctrines to disregard corporate form. As Judge Posner explained in *Inc.*, 841 F. 2d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1988). See also *Tryit Enters. Vs. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. (In re Tryit Enters.)*, 841 F. 2d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1988). ("Since the assets of affiliated corporations are not generally treated as a common pool available to the creditors of each affiliate, unusual circumstances must be present to so treat them.")

"When a parent causes one of its subsidiaries to guarantee another's (or the parent's own) debt, the parent is in danger ... that creditors of the guarantor ... will find themselves, without warning, dealing with the parent's assets. The effect of the guarantee ... is similar to that of a rule of law that treats the assets of a common pool available to the creditors of each affiliate. Such rules have sometimes been adopted, but they have often been refused to adopt them, for just the reason stated; they make it harder for creditors of an affiliate to assess their debtor's creditworthiness. If such rules were in force, "a sign of weakness in any member of the group would lead creditors to descend on each member, strong or weak, to claim their pound of flesh."

This is critical in the context of evaluating solvency --> without asserting substantive consolidation or veil piercing, you look at individual debtors individually.

The standard in S. 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II) asks whether a company has sufficient capital to support operations in light of its assets below expectations.

"An 'unreasonably small capital' would refer to the inability to generate sufficient profits to sustain operations must precede an inability to pay debts due, unreasonably small capital would seem to encompass financial difficulties short of equitable subordination." *Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc.*, 971 F.2d 1056, 1070 (3d Cir. 1992)."

"Because [a debtor's cash flow] projections tend to be optimistic, their reasonableness must be measured by a standard anchored in the company's actual performance. Among the relevant data are cash flow, profit margins and net profits and losses ... However, reliance on historical data alone is not enough. There must also account for difficulties that are likely to arise, including interest rate fluctuations and downturns, and otherwise incorporate some margin for error."

"Unreasonably small capitalization encompasses financial difficulties which are short of equitable subordination but are likely to lead to some type of insolvency eventually." *Official Committee of Toy King Distributors, Inc. v. Liberty Savings Bank (In re Toy King Distributors, Inc.)*, 256 B.R. 1

The 'inability to pay debts' prong of section 548 is met if it can be shown that the debtor made the transfer contemporaneous with an intent or belief that subsequent creditors likely would not be paid as their claim statute suggests a standard based on subjective intent, the courts have held that the intent requirement can be satisfied by facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction show that the debtor could not have reasonably believed to pay its debts as they matured ..." *WRT Creditors Liquidation Trust v. WRT Bankr. Litig. Master File Defs.* (11/15/01) B.R. 343, 415 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2001).

Regarding savings clauses (contractual provisions which purport to reduce the obligations incurred and liabilities of Conveying Subsidiaries to the extent necessary to prevent their insolvency, *In re Touse*), see Section 541(c)

"The savings clauses purport to amend liabilities and liens to make them "enforceable to the maximum extent permitted by law. However, because the Conveying Subsidiaries were insolvent even before the July 31 Transaction, they received no value from that transaction, the liabilities and liens cannot be enforced *at all*. Any attempt to enforce a Conveying Subsidiary, and any lien securing that liability, would be avoidable under Section 541(c). Therefore, the savings clauses have no effect at all.

If the Conveying Subsidiaries became insolvent only after the July 31 Transaction, the savings clauses would be enforceable under 11 U.S.C. S. 541(c)(1)(B), which provides that an interest of the debtor in property becomes avoidable notwithstanding any "provision in an agreement" that is "conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor" that "effects or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor's interest in the property." The savings clauses are "provision[s] in an agreement." They are "conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor." And they "effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor's interest in the property." In particular, the savings clauses, if given the effect claimed by the Defendants, would defeat the claim for a fraudulent transfer, and a cause of action is unquestionably property of the debtor. *United Bank of Delaware, Inc.*, 462 U.S. 198, 205 n.9 (1983). (Section 541(a)(1) "includes all kinds of property, including tangible and intangible property, and [and] causes of action." ..."

The savings clauses are unenforceable for the additional reason that efforts to contract around the core provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are invalid. See, e.g., *Glenn v. Sutton (In re Sutton)*, 324 B.R. 624, 627 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2005):

"The Debtor cannot contract the prohibition on ipso facto clauses away, nor can a Creditor enforce if the Debtor agrees to it. Therefore, despite the Creditor's attempt to contract around the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, this Court has jurisdiction over the dischargeability of the debt owed to the Creditor by the Debtor. 399 B.R. 388, 389 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009), **"By allowing parties to contract around the mutuality of the creditor or a handful of creditors could unfairly obtain payment from a debtor at the expense of other creditors thereby upsetting the priority scheme of the Code and reducing the amount available for distribution."**

There are two types of benefits to be considered in analyzing reasonably equivalent value: benefits that the Debtor receives directly ("direct benefits") and those it receives indirectly ("indirect benefits").

"As a general rule, an insolvent debtor receives less than a reasonably equivalent value where it gives up property in exchange for consideration which passes to a third party. In such cases, it ordinarily receives little benefit. See *Arthur Young & Co. (In re Computer Universe, Inc.)*, 58 B.R. 28, 30 (Bankr. M.D. Fla 1986).

To make out elements of a fraudulent conveyance claim, a plaintiff must prove that a debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the property it gave up. If the plaintiff meets the burden, the burden is then on the defendant to produce evidence that the debtors indirectly received sufficient, concrete value. See *Welt v. Jacobsen (In re Aqueduct)*, 361 B.R. 567, 582 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007)

"... once the Trustee has made his *prima facie* case that a transfer constitutes a fraudulent transfer, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the transferee to demonstrate that the Debtor received a benefit of reasonably equivalent value for the transfer for a legitimate purpose for the transfer."

The burden on the Defendants includes a requirement to show that the "indirect benefits" were tangible and can be quantified with reasonable precision.

First, the benefit must be received, even if indirectly, by "the debtor", i.e. by an individual. A benefit received by some other entity does not automatically become a benefit received by the debtor because both entities are engaged in a common business enterprise. Rather, the touchstone of the inquiry is whether the debtor's net worth has been preserved and the interests of the creditors are not injured by the transfer. The relevant inquiry under Section 548 is whether the Conveying Subsidiary received reasonably equivalent value, not whether TOUSA (or the Defendants) hoped they would receive value.

Second, any purported "indirect benefits" defense must also be limited to cognizable "value". The term "benefits," whether direct or indirect. It requires reasonably equivalent "value" and in the definition of "value" that encompasses *only* "property" and "satisfaction or securing of a present or future obligation of the debtor."

Third, property must have been received by a Conveying Subsidiary "in exchange for" the transfer of "property" that a Conveying Subsidiary would have enjoyed regardless of the July 31 Transaction. The property received "in exchange for" the transfer or obligation."

As a matter of natural usage, legal usage and bankruptcy-law usage, the Conveying Subsidiaries could not receive value if they obtained some kind of enforceable entitlement to some tangible or intangible article.

Under Section 548(c), a transferee or obligee "that takes for value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain possession of the property transferred."

transferred or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may be, to the extent that such transferee (the debtor in exchange for such transfer or obligation." To preserve liens and claims under this provision, the transferees for their benefit must prove that they acted in good faith and "gave value to the debtor."

"A transferee does not act in good faith when he has sufficient knowledge to place him on inquiry as to the debtor's possible insolvency." *Brown v. Third Nat'l Bank (In re Sherman)*, 67 F. 3d 1348, 1355 (8th Cir. 1995).

"Courts have generally held that it is not necessary to show that the transferee had actual fraudulent intent on the part of the transferee would clearly establish the lack of good faith." *S. Bradford & Co.*

S. 550(a)(1) provides that the trustee may recover "the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the proceeds from ... the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made." However, the trustee is entitled to only a single satisfaction under this provision of the statutes. Section 550(d).

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The burden of proof shifts under the two claims:
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the debtor became insolvent as a result

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